Introduction 35
In order to make optimal and adaptive decisions, animals integrate multiple sources of sensory 36 information across time and space. One of the prime examples of this is observed when animals 37 are confronted with coherently-moving stimuli during random-dot motion experiments. In such 38 experiments, performance and the corresponding neural activity vary proportionally to signal 39 strength in a way that is consistent with the progressive integration of evidence over time 40 (Shadlen et al., 1996; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001) . Besides temporal accumulation, sensory 41 integration is also possible by combining the information from multiple sensory sources (Quigley 42 et al., 2008; Schall et al., 2009; Hollensteiner et al., 2015; Wahn and König, 2015a , 2015b , 43 2016 . 44
In the case of multisensory perception, several experiments have shown that integration 45 often occurs in a statistically optimal way. This has been best demonstrated in cue-integration 46 tasks in which humans perform as if they were weighting the different sources of information 47 according to their respective reliabilities (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Alais and Burr, 2004; Körding 48 and Wolpert, 2004; Tickle et al., 2016) . This form of statistical inference has also been 49 demonstrated for cortical neurons of the monkey brain, with patterns of activity at the population 50 level that are consistent with the implementation of a probabilistic population code (Gu et al., 51 2008; Fetsch et al., 2012) . 52
In most of these sensory integration experiments, the perceptual reliability of different 53 inputs is probed through quantitative manipulations of the inputs' signal-to-noise ratios 54 (Heekeren et al., 2004; Tassinari et al., 2006; Bankó et al., 2011) . However, some percepts are 55 unreliable not because they are corrupted by noise but because they are inferred only from the 56 context and thus intrinsically uncertain. This occurs naturally in monocular vision at the 57 physiological blind spot, where content is "filled-in" based on information from the surroundings. 58
In this case, no veridical percept is possible at the blind spot location. Though changes in 59 reliability due to noise directly result in behavioral consequences, the effects of the qualitative 60 difference between veridical and inferred percepts that are otherwise apparently identical are 61 unknown. 62 We recently reported differences in the processing of veridical and inferred information 63 at the level of EEG responses (Ehinger et al., 2015) . We demonstrated that a qualitative 64 assessment of differences in reliability exists at the neural level in the form of low-and high-65 level trans-saccadic predictions of visual content. Notably, active predictions of visual content 66 differed between inferred and veridical visual information presented inside or outside the blind 67 spot. Although no difference was found between low-level error signals, high-level error signals 68 differed markedly between predictions based on inferred or veridical information. We concluded 69 that the inferred content is processed as if it were veridical for the visual system, but knowledge 70 of its reduced precision is nevertheless preserved for later processing stages. 71
In the present experiment, we address whether such an assessment of a dichotomous, 72 qualitative difference in reliability is available for perceptual decision-making. Using 3D shutter 73 glasses, we presented one stimulus partially in the participant's blind spot to elicit filling-in and a 74 second stimulus at the same eccentricity in the nasal field of view outside of the blind spot. The 75 subject's task was to indicate which of the two stimuli was continuously striped and did not 76 present a small orthogonal inset (see Fig. 1A ). Crucially, stimuli within the blind spot are filled-in 77 and thus perceived as continuous, even when they present an inset. In the diagnostic trials, 78 both stimuli were physically identical and continuous, and subjects were confronted with an 79 ambiguous decision between veridical and partially inferred stimuli. 80
We evaluated two mutually exclusive hypotheses on how perceptual decision-making 81 could proceed when confronted with an ambiguous decision between veridical and inferred 82 percepts. In the first case, we hypothesized that subjects are unable to make perceptual 83 decisions based on an assessment of differences in reliability between veridical and inferred 84 stimuli. Therefore, subjects would have an equal chance of selecting stimuli presented inside or 85 outside the blind spot. Alternatively, it might be possible to use the information about the 86 reduced reliability of filled-in information. In this case, we expect subjects to follow an optimal 87 strategy and trust a stimulus presented outside the blind spot, where the complete stimulus is 88 seen, more often than when the stimulus is presented inside the blind spot, where it is 89 impossible to know the actual content within the filled-in part. 90
Results

91
We conducted five experiments (see Fig. 1 and the methods for a detailed description of the 92 tasks). The first one tested the presence of a bias against the blind spot location; the other four 93 experiments were replications of the first experiment with additional control conditions. In the 94
first two controls, we tested the existence of biases between the nasal and temporal visual fields 95 at locations other than the blind spot. In the third control, we tested whether an opposite bias 96 existed when the task was reversed. The last experiment controls whether the observed bias 97 could be explained by probability matching. 98 99
Experiment 1 100
In the first experiment, 24 subjects performed a 2-AFC task in which they had to indicate 101 which of two stimuli was continuously striped instead of presenting a small orthogonal central 102 inset (Fig. 1A, B ). The stimuli were presented simultaneously in the periphery at the locations of 103 the blind spots or at equivalent eccentricity on the opposite side ( Fig. 1C, D) . We used a 3D 104 monitor and shutter glasses that allowed for the controlled monocular display of the stimuli. That 105 means each stimulus was visible to a single eye only. There were always two stimuli, therefore, 106 in a given trial either one or both eyes were stimulated ( Fig. 1B) . Importantly, subjects always 107 perceived the two stimuli at the same locations, to the left and the right of the fixation cross. In 108 this experiment there were perceptually ambiguous trials, where two continuous stimuli were 109 perceived, and unambiguous trials where one stimulus contained a visible inset. 110
111
In the unambiguous trials, an orthogonal inset was present in one of the stimuli. 138 Importantly, in these trials, the stimulus with the inset was outside the blind spot and therefore 139 clearly visible. As expected, subjects performed with near-perfect accuracy (Fig. 2,  140 unambiguous trials, blue data), choosing the continuous stimulus in an average of 98.8% of 141 trials (95%-quantile over subjects [96.4%-100%]). 142
There were two types of ambiguous trials. In the first type ( Fig. 2 , ambiguous control, red 143 data), one of the following applied: both stimuli were continuous and appeared outside the blind 144 spots in the nasal visual fields (Fig. 2, row 3) ; both were continuous and appeared inside the 145 blind spots (Fig. 2 , row 4); or one was continuous, the other had an inset, and both appeared 146 inside the blind spots with the inset either in the left or the right blind spot (Fig. 2 , rows 5 and 6). 147
In the case when a stimulus with an inset was present, this central part was perfectly centered 148 inside the blind spot ( Fig. 1A) , and in consequence was perceived as continuous due to filling-149 in. Thus, in all four versions, subjects perceived two identical stimuli, and there was no single 150 correct answer. In this type of ambiguous trial, subjects showed a small global leftward bias and 151 chose the left stimulus in 53.6% of trials ( that the stimulus was presented in the blind spot and, consequently, an inset stimulus within 160 was perceived as a continuous stimulus due to filling-in. In the second type of ambiguous trials one stimulus was presented inside and the other 177 outside the blind spot ( Fig. 2 , ambiguous diagnostic, data in green). This allowed us to test 178 directly between two rival predictions: whether subjects will show a bias against the stimulus 179 that is partially inferred (inset area inside the blind spot) and in favor of the veridical stimulus (in 180 the opposite visual field), or no bias. Selecting the filled-in stimulus is a suboptimal decision 181 because the stimulus presented partially in the blind spot is the only one who could possibly 182 contain the inset. This is explicit in the cases where an inset is shown in the blind spot but 183 rendered invisible by filling-in ( Fig. 2a , ambiguous trials with an inset stimulus). For analysis, we 184 modeled the probability increase of choosing the right stimulus if the right stimulus was 185 presented in either the temporal visual field of the right eye (blind spot) or the nasal visual field 186 of the left eye (non-blind spot). A similar factor was used for the left stimulus. Subsequently, the 187 two one-sided model estimates were collapsed to a single measure of preference for stimulus 188 presented at the nasal or temporal visual field (outside or inside the blind spot respectively). As presented a bias. However, in contrast to our expectations, subjects were more likely to choose 195 the filled-in percept with a 15.01% preference for stimuli presented in the temporal visual field 196 ( 95 8.49%-21.08%). In other words, when subjects had to decide which of the two stimuli 197 (both perceived as being continuous, and in most cases actually physically identical) was less 198 likely to contain an inset, they showed a bias for the one in which the critical information was not 199 sensed directly but inferred from the surrounding spatial context. Remarkably, this result is at 200 odds with both of our experimental predictions that postulated either no bias or a bias in favor of 201 the veridical stimulus. 202 203
Experiment 2 204
The second experiment was designed to replicate the unexpected result of the first 205 experiment and evaluate whether the blind spot bias observed was due to systematic 206 differences between nasal and temporal retinae. In experiment 1, we presented stimuli at mirror 207 eccentricities inside and outside the blind spot, i.e. temporal and nasal respectively (see Fig.  208 1C). In experiment 2, we tested whether the bias in experiment 1 was specific to the blind spot 209 location or related to known differences between the temporal and nasal retina (Fahle and 210 Schmid, 1988) . There is higher photoreceptor density (Curcio et al., 1990) , spatial resolution 211 (Rovamo et al., 1982) , luminance discrimination (Pöppel et al., 1973) and orientation 212 discrimination (Paradiso and Carney, 1988) at locations that project to the nasal retina (the 213 temporal visual field where the blind spots are located). Thus, we repeated our experiment with 214 a new group of subjects (n=27) and an additional experimental condition. In this new condition, 215 the two stimuli were displayed at symmetrical locations above the blind spot (25° above the 216 horizontal meridian; see Fig. 1D , purple location). The results of this second experiment 217 replicate the observations of experiment 1 (Fig. 3A ): subjects showed a bias for selecting the 218 stimulus presented inside the blind spot (12.5%, CDI 95 7.35%-17.49%). However, subjects also 219 presented a bias in the control condition, toward the stimuli presented in the temporal visual 220 field above the blind spot (6.63%, CDI 95 0.77%-12.3%). The bias was nevertheless stronger 221 inside the blind spot (paired-diff: 6.11%, CDI 95 1.16%-10.78%). In summary, additionally to the 222 bias inside of the blind spot area, we observed that subjects also showed a smaller bias for 223 stimuli presented to the nasal retina (temporal visual field). 224 225
Experiment 3 226
To better delineate the distribution of bias across the temporal visual field and to clarify if 227 the blind spot location is, in fact, special, we performed a third experiment on a new group of 228 subjects (n=24). Here, we compared biases in the blind spot to two other control conditions 229 flanking the blind spot region from either the left or the right (Fig. 3B ). The blind spot location 230 again revealed the strongest effect of a bias for the temporal visual field (13.18% 95 6.47%-231 19.64%), while the locations inwards and outwards resulted in a 2.85% and 4.8% bias, 232 respectively ( 95 -1.1%-6.65%; 95 0.58%-8.89%). The bias of both control locations was 233 different from the bias of the blind spot location (BS vs. inward: 10.51%, 95 3.55%-17.29%; 234 BS vs. outward: 8.61%, 95 0.98%-16.04%). In this experiment, as in experiments 1 and 2, 235
we observed a bias that is specific to the blind spot region. 236 237
Figure 3: Location control experiments 238
Two control experiments were designed to test whether the observed bias for the blind spot 239 could be explained by a general bias for stimuli presented in the temporal visual field. a) Results 240 of experiment 2. In a given trial, stimuli were presented either at the locations corresponding to 241 the blind spot or at locations above it. Results are presented as in figure 2b , with the addition of 242 within-subject differences between blind spot and control locations (in purple). b) Results of 243 experiment 3. In a given trial, stimuli were presented at the locations corresponding to the blind 244 spot or at locations to inward (toward the fixation cross) or outward (away from the fixation 245 cross) to it. Note that the blind spot effect is replicated in both experiments. In addition, both 246 blind spot effects are larger than in any control location. 247 248
Experiment 4 249
The results of the three previous experiments suggest that subjects considered the filled-250 in percept a better exemplar of a continuous non-inset stimulus, in disregard of the physical 251 possibility of the presence on an inset inside the blind spot. To confirm this, we performed a 252 fourth experiment with a new group of subjects (n=25). This experiment was identical to the first 253 experiment, except that in this case, the subjects' task was to choose the stimulus with an inset, 254
instead of the continuous one. In this case, if a filled-in stimulus is indeed considered a more 255 reliable exemplar of a continuous stimulus, the non blind spot stimulus should be preferred in 256 the diagnostic trials. This was the case; subjects showed a bias for selecting the stimulus 257 presented outside the blind spot (7.74%, 95 1.56%-13.68%, Fig. 4a ), thus resulting in the 258 expected reversal of the bias pattern observed in the first three experiments. This pattern is 259 again suboptimal, since this time the filled-in stimulus is the one that could conceal the target. have to choose the stimulus with an inset (instead of the continuous one). b) Results of 267 experiment 5. This control was similar to experiment 2, except that no inset stimulus was ever 268 experienced in the control location above in the temporal visual field. 269 270
Experiment 5 271
We performed a final control to evaluate whether the observed bias for a filled-in 272 stimulus was not a result of subjects using a probability matching heuristic. It is possible that, in 273 order to solve the ambiguous task, subjects used their knowledge of the rate of appearance of 274 continuous and inset stimuli at different locations as learned during unambiguous trials. As it is 275 impossible to experience an inset on the blind spot, the base rate of continuous stimuli at that 276 location is 1.0. Therefore, when confronted with two stimuli that are apparently identical, one 277 inside and one outside the blind spot, subjects might just apply the base rate they have learned 278 instead of relying on a perceptual estimate. If this is the case, subjects should show a bias for 279 the location where they experienced exclusively continuous stimuli during unambiguous trials, 280 which could result in a bias pattern similar to the one observed in experiments 1-3. To evaluate 281 this alternative explanation, we performed a further experiment with the same group of subjects 282 that participated in experiment 4. Experiment 5 was similar to experiment 2, with control trials 283 presenting stimuli above the blind spot. However, in contrast to experiment 2, subjects never 284 experienced an inset in the temporal field in the above positions during unambiguous trials (see 285 experiments was a result of probability matching, in this experiment we should observe the 289 same bias at both the blind spot and the temporal field above locations. Subjects showed a bias 290 for selecting the stimulus presented inside the blind spot (14.53%, 95 7.56%-21.09%, Fig.  291 4b), replicating again the results of experiment 1-3. At odds with the probability matching 292 hypothesis, the bias for the temporal field in the above location was only 5.84%, not different 293 from 0 ( 95 -1.33%-13.01%) and similar to what was observed in experiment 2. This bias was 294 different from the bias observed in the blind spot (paired-diff: 8.95%, 95 3.91%-13.85%). The 295 same group of subjects participated in experiment 4 and 5, allowing us to make a within 296 subjects comparison between the two tasks. Subjects' performance in these two tasks was 297 negatively correlated (r = -0.61, p = 0.002, see Figure 4 -Figure supplement 1). Taking the task 298 reversal of experiment 4 into account, this result indicates that subjects were consistently biased 299 to consider the inferred filled-in stimulus a better exemplar of a continuous stimulus. The result 300 of experiment 5 thus gives evidence that the bias for the filled-in stimulus was not a 301 consequence of subjects matching the base rate of the occurrence of different stimuli during 302 unambiguous trials. 303 304
Reaction time analysis 305
A bias for the temporal visual field, especially the blind spot, could also be reflected in the 306 distribution of reaction times. We compared the reaction times of trials where subjects selected 307 a stimulus in the temporal visual field against trials where the stimulus in the nasal visual field 308 was selected. The reaction time analysis was not planned comparisons, thus, in contrast to the 309 other analyses presented here, it is explorative. In the first experiment, we observed an average 310 reaction time of 637 ms (minimum subject average: 394 ms, maximum 964 ms; Fig. 5 ). We 311 used a linear mixed model to estimate the reaction time difference for selecting a stimulus 312 presented inside the blind spot (temporally) against one outside the blind spot (nasally). In the 313 first experiment, after excluding three outliers, we observed this effect with a median posterior 314 effect size of 13 msfaster reaction times when selecting the blind spot region ( 95% 2-42 ms). 315
The three outliers (on the right of the vertical dashed line in Fig. 5) were identified visually and 316 removed because they were distinctively different from the rest of the population. The mean of 317 the outliers was 5.2 SD away from the remaining subjects. The outliers were nevertheless in the 318 same direction of the reaction time effect and did not change its significance (with outliers, 63 319 ms, 95 7-124 ms). However, faster reaction times while selecting the blind spot stimulus 320
were not present in the other four experiments. The nominal differences were in the same 321 95 -29-37 ms). After combining all data (without experiment 4 as the task was reversed), we 326 observed a reduced reaction time for decisions for the blind spot stimulus with 10 ms ( Table 1 . In the combined model, we did not find any differences between the 343 temporal field effects at locations other than the blind spots ( Figure 6 , 4 th last to 2 nd last row). 344
That is, the temporal field effects of the locations inward, outward and above were not different 345 from each other. For the sake of clarity, we combined these location levels. Keeping everything 346 else constant, we observed that if we present one stimulus in the blind spot against the 347 equidistant nasal location, subjects are 13.82% ( 95 10.84%-16.78%, t-test, t= 8.7, df = 98, p 348 < 0.001) more likely to choose the stimulus in the blind spot. This bias is stronger than the effect 349 observed elsewhere in the temporal field by 9.35% ( 95 6.25%-12.47%; paired t-test, t = 4.8, 350 df = 74, p<0.001). In summary, subjects showed a robust bias for the blind spot locations that 351 could not be explained by a non-specific bias for the temporal visual field. In conclusion, when 352 confronted with an ambiguous choice between veridical and inferred sensory information, 353 human subjects showed a suboptimal bias for inferred information. 354 355
Figure 6: Summary and overview of blind spot effects 356
Posterior GLMM-effect estimates of all data combined (black) except experiment 4 (inversed 357 task). We also show for each experiment the 95% CI of bootstrapped means summary statistics 358 of the data (yellow). Next, we show difference values between the blind spot and all other 359 control locations (model dark, raw data pink). As discussed in the text, the control locations 360 outward, inward and above do not differ (4 th last to 2 nd last row), and thus we compare the blind 361 spot effect to all locations combined (last row). 362 363 364 Discussion 365 When confronted with identical physical stimulation, subjects showed a consistent bias for blind 366 spot inferred percepts which was stronger than the bias at any other location in the temporal 367 visual field. 368
Why do subjects choose the blind spot location when it is objectively the least reliable? 369
Our interpretation takes the results at face value: subjects must possess at least implicit 370 information about whether a percept originates from the blind spot in order to show a bias for or 371 against it. At the same time, the veridical information from the other stimulus is also available. 372
This indicates that perceptual decision-making can rely more on inferred than veridical 373 information, even when there is some knowledge about the reduced reliability of the inferred 374 input available in the brain (Ehinger et al., 2015) . This is also supported by the results of the 375 reaction time analyses that indicated a faster evidence accumulation for the inferred percepts. In 376 other words, the implicit knowledge that a filled-in stimulus is objectively less reliable does not 377 seem to be used for perceptual decision-making. This suboptimal decision between qualitatively 378 different veridical and inferred inputs is in contrast to properties of standard sensory integration. 379
There, reduced reliability derived from noisy but veridical signals results in a corresponding 380 weighting of inputs and consequently in optimal decisions (Körding et al., 2007) . In the following, 381 we discuss two potential explanations of this discrepancy of processing filled-in information and 382 standard sensory integration. The first explanation focuses on physiological properties of 383 neuronal and small circuits' response properties at and around the blind spot region. The 384 second explanation addresses the conceptual level and uses the general notion of predictive 385 coding. 386
First, although the filled-in percept is by definition independent of the stimulus within the 387 blind spot, it is nevertheless based on the information sensed by the region around the blind 388 spot in the nasal retina. We might assume that an area, e.g. in the nasal retina around the blind 389 spot region, that has a lower contrast threshold also shows stronger neuronal signals for super-390 threshold stimuli. This could in principle lead to a filled-in stimulus with increased salience as 391 compared to the veridical stimulus. Effectively, this explanation proposes that differences in 392 physiological properties of nasal and temporal retinae are transferred to the filling-in process 393 making it the "better" candidate stimulus in an ambiguous condition. Above we already 394 introduced some evidence for psychophysical differences between the nasal and temporal 395 visual field (Fahle and Schmid, 1988) . There is also some evidence for the superiority of the 396 blind spot in a Vernier task (Crossland and Bex, 2009 ). The areas around the blind spot showed 397 greater performance compared to areas at similar eccentric locations in the nasal visual field. It 398 is still unclear whether this goes over and beyond the aforementioned temporal/nasal bias. 399
Unfortunately, this explanation runs into the problem that the sensitivity in the region 400 corresponding to the blind spot in the other eye is also enhanced compared to regions at similar 401 eccentricities (Wolf and Morandi, 1962; Midgley, 1998) . This suggests that differences between 402 the eyes in the area around the blind spot should be the smallest within the contrast between 403 temporal and nasal retina. Moreover, we explicitly controlled for temporal-nasal differences in 404 experiments 2 and 3, and found that it is not enough to explain the effect specific to the blind 405 spot. Thus, an explanation of the observed effects based on known differences in retinal 406
properties is currently tentative at best. 407
An alternative explanation is based on the framework of predictive coding (Friston et al., 408 2006, 2012; Summerfield and de Lange, 2014). Specifically, context information of static stimuli 409 would be used to predict local stimulus properties leading to the phenomenon of filling-in. The 410 predicted sensory input would then be compared to the incoming sensory input, and an error 411 signal representing the mismatch would be returned. In the absence of veridical information, no 412 deviation and thus no error signal would occur. Effectively, the filled-in signal might have less 413 noise. Reduced noise, in turn, results in a smaller prediction error and higher credibility at later 414 stages. A faster reaction time to the filled-in stimulus compared to the veridical stimulus could 415 suggest that the integration process is indeed biased with less noise. In summary, although the 416 results reported here seem compatible with the predictive coding framework, this explanation 417 presently remains vague and speculative. 418
In conclusion, we find a new behavioral effect where subjects prefer a partially inferred 419 stimulus to a veridical one. Though both appear to be continuous, the filled-in one could hide an 420 inset and is, therefore, less reliable. In this perceptual decision-making task, subjects do not 421 make use of high-level assessments about the reliability of the filled-in stimulus. Even more so, 422 they prefer the unreliable percept. All subjects gave written informed consent, and the experiment was approved by the ethics 448 committee of the Osnabrück University. For the initial experiment, we set out to analyze 25 449 subjects. For the second experiment, we calculated a sample size of 18 subjects based on the 450 results of experiment 1 in order to have a power of 90% (calculated with gPower, (Faul et al., 451 2009), matched pair means cohen's-d = 0.72, planned-power 90%). We disclose that the results 452 of the initial analysis with this group were not conclusive about differences between the location 453 inside and the location above the blind spot. Although the sample size was large enough to 454 replicate the blind spot main effect, it was not adequate to find the difference between locations. 455 Therefore, we decided to increase the number of subjects by 50% (n=9). For the third, fourth 456
and fifth experiments, we used an empirical power analysis based on MLE of a linear mixed 457 model in order to achieve 90% power for the smallest effect observed outside the blind spot. 458
This resulted in a sample of 24 subjects. 459 460 Screening 461
As described above, many subjects failed a simple screening test. In this pre-462 experiment, we showed a single stimulus in the periphery either inside or outside the blind spot 463 in the left or right visual field. In two blocks of 48 trials, subjects indicated which stimulus (no 464 inset vs. inset) had been perceived. We thought of this simple experiment to evaluate our blind 465 spot calibration method, as an inset stimulus inside the blind spot should have been reported as 466 no inset. The first block was used as a training block. In the second block, we evaluated the 467 performance in a conservative way. No feedback was given to the subjects. If the performance 468 was below 95% (three errors or more), we aborted the session because the participant was 469 deemed to be too unreliable to proceed further with our experiment. We analyzed the data of 470 those that failed the screening experiment, in four categories of failures that demonstrate the 471 heterogeneity of subjects: Subjects reported inset when an inset was shown in the left blind spot 472 (44%), or in the right blind spot (78%). Subjects did not report the inset of a stimulus presented 473 outside the blind spot (37%), and subjects reported an inset, even though a continuous stimulus 474 was shown (80%). The percentage represents how many subjects had at least one trial where a 475 classification-criterion was fulfilled and thus do not add to 100%. The rates for subjects that did 476 not fail the criterion were 16%, 21%, 13% and 22% respectively. The high percentage in the last 477 category of removed subjects, in which they report an inset even though no inset was visible, 478 strongly suggests that subjects failed the task not due to blind spot related issues, but due to 479 inattention or perceptual problems. Even though we observe more wrong reports in the right 480 than the left blind spot position, there was nevertheless no correlation with calibration position or 481 size. Overall, 57% (n=100) of the recruited subjects passed this test and were admitted to 482 subsequent experiments. 483 484
Eye Tracking, Screen, Shutter Glasses 485
A remote, infrared eye-tracking device (Eyelink 1000, SR Research) with a 500 Hz sampling 486 rate was used. The average calibration error was kept below 0.5° with a maximal calibration 487 error of 1.0°. Trials with a fixation deviation of 2.6° from the fixation point were aborted. We used 488 a 24-inch, 120 Hz monitor (XL2420t, BenQ) with a resolution of 1920x1080 pixels in 489 combination with consumer-grade shutter glasses for monocular stimulus presentation (3D 490 Vision, Nvidia, wired version). The shutter glasses were evaluated for appropriate 491 crosstalk/ghosting using a custom-manufactured luminance sensor sampling at 20 kHz. The 492 measured crosstalk at full luminance was 3.94%. The subject screen distance was 60cm in 493 experiment 1, 2, 4, and 5 and 50 cm in the third experiment. 494 495
Stimuli 496
Modified Gabor patches with a frequency of 0.89 cycles/° and a diameter of 9.6° were 497 generated. Two kinds of patterns were used ( Fig. 1A) : one completely continuous and one with 498 a small perpendicular inset of 2.4°. For comparison, the blind spot typically has a diameter of 499 4°-5°. The Gabor had constant contrast in a radius of 6.3° around the center. This ensured the 500 same perception of the continuous stimulus outside the blind spot in comparison to a filled-in 501 stimulus, where the inner part is inside the blind spot. To account for possible adaptation 502 effects, horizontal and vertical stimuli were used in a balanced and randomized way across the 503 trials. Stimuli were displayed using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997 , RRID: 504 SCR:002881) and Eyelink Toolbox (Cornelissen et al., 2002) . The stimuli were displayed 505 centered at the individually calibrated blind spot location. The stimulus at the location above the 506 blind spot in experiment 2 was at the same distance as the blind spot but was rotated by 25° to 507 the horizon around the fixation cross. For the inward and outward condition of experiment 3, 508 stimuli were moved nasally or temporally by 8.6°. Thus the stimuli had an overlap of only 1°. 509
Less overlap is not possible without either cutting the border of the screen or overlapping with 510 the fixation cross. 511
512
Task 513
After a fixation period of 500 ms, we presented two stimuli simultaneously to the left and right of 514 the fixation cross. Subjects were instructed to indicate via button press (left or right) which 515 stimulus was continuous. Each stimulus was presented either in the temporal or nasal field of 516 view. In some trials, the required response was unambiguous, when one of the stimuli showed 517 an inset and the other did not (and the inset stimulus was presented outside the blind spot). In 518 many trials (80% of all experiments and locations, 46% when the stimulus was shown above the 519 blind spot in experiment 2), both stimuli were continuous and no uniquely correct answer existed 520 (see Figure 1 -Figure supplement 1 for a detailed overview of the balancing). All trials were 521 presented in a randomized order. If the subject had not given an answer after 10 seconds, the 522 trial was discarded, and the next trial started. All in all, subjects answered 720 trials over 6 523 blocks; in experiment 1 the trials were split up into two sessions. After each block, the eye 524 tracker and the blind spot were re-calibrated. After cleaning trials for fixation deviation and blinks, 525 an average of 662 trials (90%-quantile: 585, 710) remained. For two subjects, only 360 trials could 526 be recorded. 527
Bootstrap in figures 529
In several figures, we present data with summary statistics. To construct the confidence 530 intervals we used bias-corrected, accelerated 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals of the 531 mean with 10,000 resamples. Note that the summary statistics do not need to conform to the 532 posterior summary estimates because they are marginals. Only the posterior model values 533 reflect the estimated effect. 534 535
Blind spots 536
In order to calibrate the blind spot locations, subjects were instructed to use the keyboard to 537 move a circular monocular probe on the monitor and to adjust its size and location to fill the 538 blind spot with the maximal size. They were explicitly instructed to calibrate it as small as 539 necessary to preclude any residual flickering. The circular probe flickered from dark gray to light 540 gray to be more salient than a probe with constant color (Awater, 2005) . All stimuli were 541 presented centered at the respective calibrated blind spot location. In total, each subject 542 calibrated the blind spot six times. For the following comparisons of blind spot characteristics, 543
we evaluated one-sample tests with the percentile bootstrap method (10,000 resamples) of 544 trimmed means (20%) with alpha = 0.05 (Wilcox, 2012) . For paired two-sample data, we used 545 the same procedure on the difference scores and bias-corrected, accelerated 95% bootstrapped 546 confidence intervals of the trimmed mean (20%). We report all data combined over all 547 experiments. In line with previous studies (Wolf and Morandi, 1962; Ehinger et al., 2015) , the left 548 and right blind spots were located horizontally at -15.52° (SD=0.57° CI: [-15 in the vertical direction (p=0.37), but this is likely due to the oval shape of the blind spot in this 555 dimension and the usage of a circle to probe the blind spot. These effects seem small, did not 556 affect the purpose of the experiments and will not be discussed further. 557
558
GLMM analysis 559
We fitted a Bayesian logistic mixed effects model predicting the probability of responding "right" 560 with multiple factors that represent the temporal over nasal bias and several other covariates 561 described below. Because we were interested in the bias between the nasal fields and the 562 temporal fields of view, we combined both predictors for the left and right temporal (and nasal, 563 respectively) locations and reported the combined value. 564
Data were analyzed using a hierarchical logistic mixed effects models fitted by the No-U-565
Turn Sampler (NUTS, STAN Development Team). The model specification was based on an 566 implementation by Sorensen and Vasisth (Sorensen and Vasishth, 2015) . In the results section, 567 we report estimates of linear models with the appropriate parameters fitted on data of each 568 experiment independently. We also analyzed all data in one combined model: there were no 569 substantial differences between the results from the combined model and the respective 570 submodels (Appendix table 1 ). The models are defined as follows using the 
577
Two factors were between subjects: handedness and dominant eye. In total, we have 578 four within-subject factors, resulting in eight parameters: There are two main factors 579 representing whether the left, and respectively the right, stimulus was inside or outside the 580 temporal field. Depending on the experiment, the main factor location had up to three levels: the 581 stimuli were presented outward (Exp. 3), inward (Exp. 3), above (Exp 2, 5) or on (all 582 experiments) the blind spot. In addition, we modeled the interactions between location and 583 whether the left stimulus (and the right stimulus, respectively) was shown temporally. In order to 584 assure independence of observation, an additional within-subject main factor answer(t-1) was 585 introduced, which models the current answer based on the previous one. In frequentist linear 586 modeling terms, all within-subject effects were modeled using random slopes clustered by 587 subject and a random intercept for the subjects. We used treatment coding for all factors and 588 interpreted the coefficients accordingly. 589
In the model, we estimated the left and right temporal field effects separately. For the 590 statistical analysis, we combined these estimates by inverting the left temporal effect and 591 averaging with the right temporal effect. We did this for all samples of the mcmc-chain and took 592 the median value. We then transformed these values to the probability domain using the 593 inverse-logit function, subtracting the values from 0.5 and multiplying by 100. All results were 594 still in the linear range of the logit function. We calculated 95% credible intervals the same way 595 and reported them as parameter estimates ( 95 lower-upper) in the text. These transformed 596 values represent the additive probability (in %) of choosing a left (right) stimulus that is shown in 597 the left (right) temporal field of view compared to presenting the left (right) stimulus in the nasal 598 field of view, keeping all other factors constant. 599 600
Reaction times 601
Initially, we did not plan to analyze the reaction time data. These analyses are purely 602 explorative. The response setup consisted of a consumer keyboard. Thus delays and jitters are 603 to be expected. However, with an average of 494 ambiguous trials per subject, we did not 604 expect a spurious bias between conditions due to a potential jitter. the multi-variate mixed-effects population distribution. We calculated the subject-wise blind spot 771 effect, collapsed over both blind spots. The posterior predictive estimates are shown in red. 772
They match the empirical distribution of blind spot effects (black line, histogram and scatter plot 773 below) closely. 774 We conclude that our model is adequate to capture the patterns of interest in our study an inset stimulus (dark-blue) was shown but fell into the blind spot. On the right side 784 (perception), these are simply added to the respective continuous (blue) cases. We mark with 785 red the columns that indicate trials where an inset was shown in the temporal field. Note that 786 perceptually these trials only exist in the locations above/inward/outward the blind spot, but are 787 impossible inside the blind spot (due to fill-in). Because the resulting statistical distribution might 788 influence decisions by the subjects (see results of experiment 5, probability matching), 789 experiment 5 was a repetition of experiment 2 without these trials. Fraction of choosing the right stimulus dependent on location (indicated by icon) and experiment 796 (Exp. 1: n=24, Exp. 2: n=27, Exp. 3: n=24, Exp. 4: n=25, Exp. 5: n=24). For plotting purposes, 797
we preprocessed the data of each subject by subtracting their respective global bias. Each gray 798 dot depicts one subject. The error bars depict mean, and 95% bootstrapped CI. A bias for the 799 blind spot was visible in the form of "left" responses when the left stimulus was presented in the 800 temporal visual field of the left eye (green, nasal/blind spot retina of the left eye) and of more 801 "right" responses when the right stimulus was presented in the temporal visual field of the right 802 eye (green, nasal/blind spot of the right eye) in all experiments. A bias was visible in the other 803 tested locations, but it was much smaller. Control conditions show that there was no bias if the 804 stimuli were shown either both inside the temporal fields (dark blue) or both inside the nasal 805 fields (light blue). 806 807 808
Figure 4 -Figure supplement 1: Correlation between eperiment 4 and 5 809
Global-bias subtracted blind spot effect for each subject in experiment 4 and 5. Subjects 810 showed a negative bias towards the nasal stimulus outside the blind spot in experiment 4 (the 811 task-switch experiment) and a positive bias towards the temporal stimulus inside the blind spot 812 in experiment 5. The reference line has a slope of 1. The fit is the first principle component 813 (representing total least squares). The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.61 (p=0.0016). 814 815
